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Chile–China Trade at a Turning Point (2024–2025)

Updated: Jan 2



If you export from Chile to China, 2025 probably felt like a paradox.

Volumes were there. Demand didn’t disappear. China kept buying. And yet, margins tightened, payments felt slower, logistics were more stressful, and concentration risk became impossible to ignore.


This is not a post about how your business works. You already know that better than anyone. Instead, this is a step back—a look at adjacent levers that Chilean SMEs often underuse: FX structure, payment architecture, inventory discipline, logistics buffers, and market positioning beyond the obvious.


1. 2025 in one sentence: China didn’t close — it filtered

Across cherries, salmon, wine, and other agro-industrial exports, the pattern was consistent:

  • China remained Chile’s most important non-mineral export market.

  • Volumes were strong, sometimes record-breaking.

  • But pricing power weakened, and operational mistakes were punished faster.


This matters because the most significant risk for Chilean SMEs in China is no longer access to the market. It’s execution risk at scale.


2. What really changed in 2024–2025


A. Volume stopped being a protection

Cherries are the clearest example. Export volumes surged, but prices softened. The lesson applies far beyond cherries:

In China, volume alone no longer protects margins.

The same logic showed up in:

  • Wine (more liters, lower average prices).

  • Salmon (stable demand, tougher negotiations).

  • Processed foods (buyers pushing for longer terms).

China is signaling something important: “We want reliable suppliers, not opportunistic sellers.”


B. The real bottleneck shifted from tariffs to operations

Chile’s trade framework with China remains favorable. Tariffs were not the issue in 2025.

The friction came from:

  • Timing (missing narrow demand windows).

  • Documentation.

  • Cold-chain discipline.

  • Payment structure.

  • Over-concentration on one channel, one buyer, or one city.


This is uncomfortable because it moves risk outside the exporter’s control.


C. Payments quietly became strategic

Many exporters felt it, but didn’t label it correctly. In 2025:

  • Buyers pushed harder on payment terms.

  • RMB appeared more frequently in discussions.

  • FX volatility mattered more than headline prices.

  • Cash conversion cycles stretched.


For SMEs, this is dangerous because profitability and liquidity diverge quickly.


3. A simple way to frame 2026 risk for Chilean exporters

Below is a practical lens—not theory—to think about 2026.

Risk area

What it looks like in practice

Why it matters

Market concentration

Too much volume tied to China or one buyer

One shock = immediate margin loss

FX exposure

Selling in USD only, paying part of costs in CLP

FX gains/losses erase operating margin.

Payment structure

Direct China–Chile flows, long-term

Cash stress even with “good sales.”

Logistics timing

No buffer for delays or inspections

Missed windows = destroyed value

Inventory discipline

Shipping everything, no demand smoothing

Price collapses during peak weeks.

None of these is about producing better fruit, fish, or wine. They are about how trade is structured, not what is traded.


4. Practical mitigation moves for 2026


A. Treat FX as a margin tool, not an afterthought

Many Chilean exporters still think in “USD sales – CLP costs”. That’s incomplete.


Practical moves:

  • Explore partial RMB pricing when buyers ask (even if settlement converts later).

  • Separate commercial currency from settlement currency.

  • Review FX monthly, not quarterly, during peak season.


Prices are market-driven and largely out of the exporter’s control. FX is not. Managing currency exposure—even incrementally—can have a more consistent and positive impact on margins than attempting to push prices in China.


B. Use Hong Kong as a buffer, not as a tax trick

This is often misunderstood. Hong Kong works well because it:

  • Separates China operational risk from cash management.

  • Allows flexibility in RMB, USD, and other currencies.

  • Improves payment timing control.

  • Reduces friction, not compliance.


For SMEs, this is not about sophistication. It’s about not letting cash flow depend entirely on one jurisdiction.


C. Smooth volume instead of chasing peaks

China’s demand is strong—but highly concentrated in time.


For 2026:

  • When feasible, think in delivery curves, not just total volume.

  • Hold back a portion of inventory for secondary windows when demand allows it.

  • Coordinate shipping to avoid everyone arriving the same week.


This is counterintuitive but often more profitable.


D. Stop thinking of logistics as “cost only”

Logistics is margin protection. Exporters who did better in 2025:


  • Booked capacity early.

  • Used consistent ports and partners.

  • Built slack into schedules.

  • Accepted slightly higher freight in exchange for certainty.


Reliability beats cheap shipping when markets are crowded.


E. Import know-how from China, not just products

Chilean SMEs import significant quantities from China, including machinery, packaging, and inputs. Few import process knowledge.


Examples:

  • Packaging optimization to extend shelf life.

  • Automation know-how from Chinese equipment suppliers.

  • Digital sales and demand forecasting practices.


This is an underused competitive advantage.


5. Adjacent opportunities beyond the obvious exports

Chile’s strength is not only what it ships, but what it knows how to do. Adjacent opportunities include:


  • Mining-related services and equipment.

  • Cold-chain logistics expertise.

  • Food safety, traceability, and sustainability processes.

  • Agro-industrial processing know-how.


China increasingly values solutions, not just commodities.


6. A realistic outlook for 2026

Let’s be direct.


  • China will remain critical for Chilean SMEs.

  • Competition will increase, not decrease.

  • Prices will remain under pressure.

  • Operational discipline will matter more than ever.


But this is not bad news. It favors exporters who:


  • Think structurally, not transactionally.

  • Protect cash flow as aggressively as sales.

  • Use currency, logistics, and inventory as strategic tools.


China is not closing the door. It is quietly raising the bar.


Final thought

Most Chilean exporters don’t need to “sell more”.They need to capture more value from what they already sell. 2026 is not about reinventing your business. It’s about tightening the parts surrounding it.


That’s where the margin is now.


If this resonates and you’d like to go deeper, we’re happy to share a more detailed analysis in Spanish and English. Contact us at contact@crossbordercompass.com.


References (selected)

  • Frutas de Chile – industry publications and seasonal reports

  • SalmonChile – export summaries and market updates

  • Wines of Chile – export and market commentary

  • DP World Chile – logistics and cold-chain infrastructure releases

  • FreshPlaza, Fructidor, FreshFruitPortal – sector coverage and interviews

  • Chilean Customs (Servicio Nacional de Aduanas) – trade data summaries

 
 
 

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Hi,
I'm Juan Luis

Born in Santiago, Chile, Juan Luis is a civil engineer from the Catholic University of Chile, with advanced studies in Spain and an MBA from UT Austin. He has held senior finance and risk management regional roles at GE and Citibank across Chile, Mexico, and the U.S. He has also invested in early-stage companies in Latin America and real estate projects and collaborated to establish a network of vendors in China.

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